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CH A PTE R I.
IN TRO D U CTIO N

Taiwan was originally one of the provinces of the Republic o f China (ROC).
After the Civil War between the ROC and the Chinese Communists in 1949, the ROC
government moved to Taiwan, China was separated into two countries — the Republic
o f China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After 1949 the two countries had
no trading relationship nor other forms of contact, because it violated ROC’s Martial Law.
Since 1987, trading and investment activities between Taiwan and China have rapidly
increased, and Taiwanese investments are increasing at a faster rate than those of other
countries.
Taiwan now ranks as the w orld’s twelfth largest trading nation.

In 1989, the

estimated value of Taiwan’s foreign trade was US$120 billion, and its per capita Gross
National Product (GNP) was about US$8,000,* 25th in the world.^ In 1990, Taiwan’s
foreign-exchange reserves were nearly US$75 billion.^
As a small island, Taiwan is limited in most o f the natural resources needed to
produce manufactured goods.

Its industries depend on import for raw materials and

natural resources. China is the largest raw material and herbal medicine exporter for
Taiwan’s industries.
Indirect trade through Hong Kong or other third party countries is the only means
of trade between Taiwan and China.

In 1988, Hong Kong ranked as Taiw an’s third

export and fourth import trading partner, (see Table 1) Indirect bilateral trade between
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Taiwan and China in 1988 reached US$3.4 billion, 42.5 times more than in 1979.* It
represented almost half of the total trade between Taiwan and Hong Kong that year.

Table 1
T A IW A N ’S FIV E LEADING TRADING PA RTN ERS (1988)
(Unit; US$ million)
E xports to
Amount
Im p o rts from
U.S.A.
23,432.0
Japan
Japan
8,762.1
U.S.A.
Hong Kong
5,579.7
West Germany
W est Germany
2,338.1
Hong Kong
United Kingdom 1,904.9
Australia

Am ount
14,824.2
13,002.0
2,132.1
1,921.7
1,336.2

Source; Republic of C hina Y earbook. (Taipei, Taiwan, Kwang Hwa Co., 1989); 716.

In the

1980’s, the internal economic environment of Taiwan expanded

tremendously and rapid export expansion gave rise to a change in the entire society. The
savings rate has exceeded that o f investment in the domestic market since 1981 (e.g. in
1987, the saving rate was 39.3 percent and the investment rate was 19.6 percent).* The
fact that there was an abundance of capital and a shortage of investment areas not only
caused Taiwan’s housing, land and stock prices to skyrocket, but also resulted in
continued appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar (NT$). In 1985, US$1 converted to
almost NT$40; in August, 1991 the exchange rate was NT$26.82 to US$1. (see Table 2)
A combination of the rapidly expanding economy, and the wide availability o f higherpaying jobs (in 1989, the unemployment rate in Taiwan was 1.37 percent),* reduced the
number of Taiwanese willing to work in manual labor jobs. This caused a tighter labor
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market, increasing wage rates, and rising production costs in Taiwan.

T able 2
EX CH A NG E RATES, N EW TAIW AN D O LLA R CO N V ERTED TO U.S. D O LLA R
(Unit: Per US$)

Mo/Dv/Y r
12/31/81
12/31/82
12/31/83
12/31/84
12/31/85
12/31/86
12/31/87
12/31/88
12/31/89
12/31/90
08/02/91

Taiw an: NT D ollar
Selling R ates
Buying R ates
38.05
37.95
39.96
39.86
40.32
40.22
39.52
39.42
39.80
39.90
35.55
35.45
28.60
28.50
28.22
28.12
26.22
26.12
27.20
27.10
26.82
26.92

Sources: R.O.C., Executive Yuan, Council for Economic Planning & Development,
Taiw an Statistical D ata Book. June 1988; 199; R.O.C., Executive Yuan, Council for
Economic Planning & Development. In d u stry o f F ree C hina, March 1989;198-199; T he
Asian W all S treet Jo u rn al. January 7, 1991;14; T he Asian W all S treet Jo u rn a l.
August 5. 1991 ;26

Rapid industry expansion also caused Taiwan to become an expensive place for
industry.

The internal industrial structure has transformed from labor-intensive to

capital-intensive and technology-intensive. Taiwanese entrepreneurs, especially in laborintensive enterprises, have started to look outside Taiwan to establish their businesses,
(see Table 3)
Taiwanese investment in China can be traced back to 1982. At that time, there
were only a few Taiwanese investors setting up enterprises in China. Due to the change
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in the economic structure and investment environment in Taiwan, businesses have been
actively investing in China since 1986. In 1988, the year after the Taiwanese government
lifted its ban on Taiwanese citizens visiting China, there were more than 200 Taiwanese
investment projects in China. Before 1988, there were 430 Taiwanese projects totalling
US$600 million in China.^

T able 3
T A IW A N ’S OVERSEAS INV ESTM EN T
1986
1987
No. of Value
No. of Value
Cases (US$m) Cases (US$m)
Thailand
3
5.8
102 300
Malaysia
none none
37 90
Indonesia
n.a. 1.8
3
1
Philippines
1 0.07
18
9
Hong Kong
1 0.26
3
1
C hina
n.a. n.a.
n.a. 100
U.S.
16 46.00
21
70
1 0.2
Europe
3
10
Rest o f World 20
2.8
6
6

1988
No. of Value
Cases (US$m)
308 842
111 307
19 500
45 109
9
8
n.a. 600
42 123
17
16
13
18

1989
No. o f Value
Cases (USSml
214 871
187 785
46 150
21 149
5
10
n.a. 600
55 509
13 73
18 62

Source: R.O.C., Industrial Development and Investment Center and Chung Hwa Institute
for Economic Research.

Presently, the Taiwanese government only allows its people to invest in China
through companies in third party countries. There were still 1,117 Taiwanese investors
who obtained approval from Mainland China in 1990, for a total investment o f US$984
million. This ranked Taiwan as the second largest investor in China, next to Hong Kong.
The Taiwanese concentrate their investments in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), in
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which the PRC government grants special privileges to attract foreign capital (Le.,
banking services, taxes preferential, land, and housing ownership and using rights). Also
popular are the opened coastal cities, which the PRC government wants to use as
development models to develop inner parts of China.®
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the investment environment and the current
investment activities of Taiwanese investors in three SEZs — Shenzhen, Shantou, and
Xiamen — and in two opened coastal cities of China — Shanghai and Dalian. This study
will discuss current investment activities and the industries that are more suitable for
Taiwanese investors. The paper will then continue with discussion of the obstacles (i.e.,
the quality of labor forces, currency problems, the legal system, and other internal factors)
that affect foreign investors.
Throughout the paper, the terms Mainland China, China and PRC will be used
interchangeably. Taiwan or ROC will be used for the island also known as Formosa.
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CH APTER n .
PER SPEC TIV ES O N R E P U B L IC O F C H IN A
AND
P E O P L E ’S R E P U B L IC O F C H IN A E C O N O M IC R E L A T IO N S

In M ay 1981, China revoked the rule o f T ariff Privilege which T aiw anese could
obtain special tariff treatm ent exporting goods to C hina from Taiw an. This caused
a reduction o f Taiwanese indirect exports to China.^ (see T able 4) China started to
establish Special Econom ic Z ones (SE Z s) to attract foreign investm ent, but the
relationship betw een Taiwan and China was still retained.
N on-Interference in O ne-W ay Indirect T rad e, 1985-1987
Since 1984, the tren d has b een tow ard large foreign investm ents into China.
Foreign investm ent was encouraged not only in SEZs, b u t also in 14 coastal cities and
th ree deltas, the areas which account for m ost o f th e industrial and com m ercial
business in th e national economy, (see T able 5)

In 1986, C hina prom ulgated

Provisional Regulations on Foreign V entures, which allowed foreign investors to
wholly own their enterprises in these open-door areas.

T h e Provisions for the

E ncouragem ent of Foreign Investm ent w ere also issued. T h e central governm ent
w ent a step further; it not only relinquished m uch o f its control over trading business
to local governm ents or individual enterprises them selves, b u t also relaxed its control
over foreign currency.

T hese m easures o p en ed th e door m uch w ider to foreign

investors.
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T able 4
R E-EX PO RTS OF TAIW AN GOODS T O CHINA T H R O U G H HONG KO NG
HK*s Re-exports
G row th rate of G row th ra te of
to China
Taiw an’s total
P R C ’s total
Y ear
V alue
G row th export value
im port value
qjS$l,0(KD ratef% )
(%)_____________
35.54
51
51.0
1978
21,291
41,747.05
26.93
43.9
1979
242,244
23.00
1980
1,137.80
24.7
1981
390,186
61.07
14.10
-0.3
1982
208,159
-46.65
-1.80
-10.3
1983
168,643
-18.98
13.10
6.0
1984
425,618
21.20
152.38
36.8
1985
987,977
35.4
132.13
0.90
1986
811,024
-17.91
29.70
-3.6
1987 1,226,839
34.50
51.27
1.0
1988 2,242,200
82.76
13.00
27.9
1989 2,896,487
29.18
9.30
7.0
—

Sources; R.O.C., Chung-kuo t’ung-chi nien-chien 1989 (Statistical yearbook of China
1989) (Chung-kuo t ’ung-chi c h ’u-pan-she, 1989), 633; Lien-ho pao (United Daily News)
(Taipei), February 16, 1990;6

During this time, the Taiwanese government still maintained its position that
bilateral trade between China and Taiwan was illegal. It was not until July, 1985, that
the Taiwanese government, under pressure from both international trends and domestic
public opinion, announced that it would stand by the principle of "non-interference" and
"non-encouragement" in dealing with exports of Taiwanese goods to Mainland China
through third party countries. The main products that Taiwan shipped to M ainland China
at that time were raw chemical fibers, textiles, building materials, machinery and
electrical appliances.
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T able 5
G R O W TH O F D IR EC T FO R E IG N INVESTM ENT IN CH IN A (1979
(bv n u m b e r of contracts)
C ontracts
Y ear
signed
1980
83
320
1981
1982
519
1983
470
1984
1,856
1985
3,073
1986
1,498
1987
2,233
1988
5,890

Cum ulative
total
83
403
922
1,392
3,248
6,321
7,819
10,052
15,942

(by capital am ount, US$ billions)
A m ount nledeed
Y ear
Yearlv
C um ulative
1979-1982
N.A.
6.01
1983
7.74
1.73
1984
2.65
10.39
1985
5.93
16.32
1986
2.83
19.15
1987
3.71
22.86
1988
5.20
28.06

A m ount utilized
C um ulative
Y earlv
N.A.
1.17
0.64
1.80
1.26
3.06
4.72
1.66
1.87
6.59
2.31
8.90
2.40
11.30

1988)

Source: R.O.C., Ministry o f Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.

In return. Mainland China supplied Taiwan with herbal medicines, minerals, and
special local products — animal by-products and raw materials for the chemical industry.
Indirect trade surged and in 1985 the total amount exceeded US$1.1 billion.‘°
In the mid-1980’s, another important dimension of Taiwan-Mainland economic
relations emerged: some Taiwanese investors, who were sanguine about the market
potential and irreversibility o f the Mainland’s ongoing economic reform, started searching
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for direct investment opportunities on China’s southeast coast.”
1987 to M id-1989
Although the total amount of Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia surpassed
that in China, the value and the number of Taiwanese investments in China increased year
by year, (see Table 3) Investors were lured by lower wage rates (the average monthly
wage rate was US$60 in China, compared to US$6(X) in Taiwan), rental of land or
factories, a huge pool of labor, ample raw materials and convenience in using the same
language, all o f which could reduce the trading cost between Taiwan and China.”
China was now eager to obtain high-tech knowledge, management and marketing
skills and as much foreign capital as possible, Taiwanese investors were welcomed in
China not only for political reasons, such as a desire for reunification, but also for the
reasons stated above.
With the new Provisions for the Encouragement o f Foreign Investment, Taiwanese
investors accelerated their investment in the southeast coast o f China in 1986. In 1987,
the Taiwanese government announced that restrictions on indirect imports of twenty-seven
agricultural and industrial raw materials from the PRC (China) were terminated. Taiwan
residents were also permitted to visit their relatives in the PRC starting in November,
1987.

In August, 1988, the Taiwanese government legalized the indirect import of

another fifty categories o f PRC agricultural and industrial raw materials (e.g. coal, steel,
raw cotton, and others).
In April, 1988, China passed the Law of Foreign Cooperative Enterprise to
encourage foreign investors to invest in China by means o f technical co-operation, joint
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ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. In July o f 1988, China announced the
National Regulations On Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots’ Investment. This legislation
allowed Taiwanese citizens to invest in the same types o f enterprises and to enjoy the
same tax breaks as other foreign investors. Taiwanese investors were also given special
privileges not available to other foreign investors, such as the right to buy and sell real
estate, enterprise stocks and bonds.^^
As a result of these incentives, indirect trade and Taiwanese investment in China
reached its highest levels to date. The total amount of indirect bilateral trade in 1988
increased to US$2.72 billion, compared to US$1.56 billion in 1987. In 1988, Taiwanese
investment in the PRC amounted to US$600 million, while the total accumulated amount
o f Taiwanese investment during the years 1979-1987 amounted to only US$100
million.''* During 1979-1987, the goods that China imported from Taiwan were mostly
cloth, electronics, chemical fiber, machinery, transportation equipment and raw materials
for chemical industries. In return, China exported an abundant supply o f coal, petroleum,
cotton, minerals (uranium, tungsten, tin, antimony, and mercury), traditional Chinese
medicinal herbs and animal and plant products.'^ Most of Taiw an’s investments were
still focused on labor-intensive industries and infrastructure businesses, including textiles,
toys, sporting shoes and umbrellas in the SEZs and southeast coastal areas.
Post-Tiananm en
After the popular uprising which culminated in Tiananmen Square on June 4,
1989, China took actions designed to control foreign investment and solve its internal
economic problems (e.g., shortage of foreign currency and serious domestic inflation).
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Investors from Japan, the U.S., Korea, European countries and Taiwan pared down or
completely stopped their investments.

Numerous foreign countries stopped their

technologic cooperation with China, and suspended their loans, and foreign countries
suggested to their citizens that they cease investment contracts with China.^*
Eventually, China started re adjusting its direction. It hosted conferences in the
SEZs and east coast cities to explain in detail the Tiananmen incident. It declared again
its adherence to the open-door policy and privileges for foreign investors. In order to
attract more investors, China lengthened its land-use rights to 70 years in several o f its
larger cities (e.g. Xiamen, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hainan).

It also created Taiwanese

Investment Zones (TIZs) in Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and other provinces.^^
Although trading and investment activities obviously declined after the Tiananmen
incident, the total trade across the straits still grew by 28 percent in 1989, reaching
US$3.5 billion.’* New investment in that year amounted to US$440 million.
By order of the Taiwanese government, direct investment in China is still illegal
for Taiwanese investors.

Hence, Taiwanese investment must still be done indirectly

through companies in a third country. In 1990, the indirect trade between the two sides
reached US$4 billion and approved Taiwan enterprises there numbered 1,117.’’ This
is a 105 percent increase over 1989.

Total investment reached US$984 million, 225

percent as much as that in 1989.
O f all the SEZs and east coast cities, Fujian Province is the major investment
target, receiving almost three-fourths o f the total investments from the Taiwanese.^
During this time, the goods Taiwan indirectly exported to China were chiefly industrial
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materials and parts and components, followed by electronical parts and components,
plastic raw materials and machinery and equipment. Herbal medicines remained Taiw an’s
leading indirect import from China, followed by food products, tobacco, and fuel.^*
In recent years, the structure of Taiwanese investment in China’s SEZs and coast
cities has changed. First, it has been shifting from labor-intensive industry to high-tech
intensive industry and capital-intensive industry. Second, investment activities are now
extending in such a way that the cooperative fields o f the two sides are expanding to
include industrial investment as well as agricultural cooperation. Third, investors are
prolonging their involvement from short-term to long-term investment (i.e. contracts
extending from 15 years to 30 years).

Fourth, investment diversity is increasing,

expanding from investment in a single industry to widespread investment in related
industries. Finally, the number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises is increasing.^
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C H A PT E R

in.

T H E INV ESTM EN T EN V IRO N M EN T O F C H IN A ’S SPE C IA L E C O N O M IC
ZONES AND M A JO R CO A STA L C IT IE S
AND
CU R REN T IN V ESTIN G A CTIV ITIES

In order to attract foreign investment to achieve its modernization strategy, China
established, four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in August, 1980; Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and
Shantou, which are all in Guangdong Province; and Xiamen, in Fujian Province. In 1988,
a fifth SEZ was established on Hainan Island. In 1984, it opened fourteen coastal cities
(Dalian, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nantong, Qianghuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang,
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai) which were more
economically developed, had obtained higher technology and had more convenient
transportation than other areas in China. China also granted foreign investors special
privileges in the open cities and SEZs.^
In 1985, three deltas along the east coast were opened to investment: the Yangtze
Delta near Shanghai, the Zhujiang Delta near Guangdong, and the Zhanjiang Delta near
Xiamen. Also opened were Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas.^
Together, all those cities and areas contain approximately 49 percent o f the total
labor involved in light industries, 51 percent of the fixed assets and 55 percent o f the total
production value in China.“ As such, they have become the lifelines o f the internal and
external markets of China.

13
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The central government in Beijing has given local governments the authority to
approve foreign investment, within certain limits. Shanghai can approve projects of up
to renminbi (Rmb) 200 million (US$38 million). (US$1 is equal to Rmb 5.32.)“ Beijing
and Tianjin cities can decide on projects of up to Rmb 150 million (US$28 million). The
coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Liaoning, and other cities such as Dalian,
Guangzhou, and Shenyang can rule on projects valued at up to Rmb 50 million (US$10
million).

Other provinces, autonomous regions and coastal cities can usually make

decisions on projects up to Rmb 25 million (US$4.7 million). The SEZs have been given
authority to approve heavy industrial projects under Rmb 50 million (US$10 million) and
light industrial projects under Rmb 30 million (US$5.6 million).^
T he SEZs: Shenzhen, Shantou, an d Xiamen
Because Hainan is only in the early stages of development and there is minimal
investing activity there and in Zhuhai, these two SEZs will not be included in the analysis
in this paper.
Initially, significant obstacles to investment remained. The political situation and
legal standards of SEZs were unstable, the quality o f the workforce was not as good as
had been expected, the freedom to hire and fire labor was limited, and market
opportunities were limited. China’s infrastructure (transportation, energy, communication,
water supplies and other basic economic necessities) and the legal system were still
largely undeveloped at the time, and investors were waiting to analyze developments these
areas. Nevertheless, in 1988, Taiwanese investors moved into China’s coastal areas and
the SEZs grew.“ Although Hong Kong still has the largest number of projects and most
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money invested in China, Taiwan is the country that boasts the most rapidly increasing
rate of investment.^
In the past three years, foreign investment and production output have increased
in the SEZs and other open areas.

The SEZs have served as gateways of economic

exchange and cooperation between China and foreign countries.

Infrastructure

development in the SEZs has been rapid, providing the necessary environment to attract
investors, which has helped China prosper. At the same time, economic strategies have
taken shape, involving the absorption of foreign funds and an emphasis on industrial
exports.^
The following is a description and analysis of each of the SEZs and the opened
coastal cities which have received the bulk o f Taiwanese investments or have more
potential for Taiwanese investors.
Shenzhen SEZ
In 1980, Shenzhen was still a sleepy village with an area o f no more than 3 square
kilometers and an industrial base o f 20 small factories. Today, the city has expanded to
occupy at least 61 square kilometers o f land. Shenzhen was the pioneer area for rapid
development in China during the decade from 1980-1990.^* One of the m ajor factors
contributing to its rapid development is its geographic location. It is close to Hong Kong
and the living style, language, and customs are similar in both places. As a result, much
Hong Kong capital was attracted to this area. Shenzhen is also the largest import and
export city in the south of China, with a total trade volume that was the third highest
among China’s coastal cities, behind Shanghai and Tianjin.
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Before 1979, 80 percent of the population o f Shenzhen was engaged in agriculture.
By 1988, it was only 30 percent. Nevertheless, the value of agricultural production has
increased by 150 percent from 1980 to 1990. The agricultural production structure has
also changed from focusing on grains to aquatic products, fruit, vegetables, pigs and
chickens.^
Industrial output has seen similar growth. Since 1985, the average annual increase
in industrial output has been 40-50 percent in Shenzhen, while the average annual growth
of the entire country o f China has been only 17.5 percent.

The main industries in

Shenzhen include electronics, textiles, apparel, food processing, drinks, precision
instruments, machinery, chemicals, building materials and petrochemicals.^’
Shenzhen was established earlier than other SEZs, so its infrastructure (railroad,
highway, airport, harbor, telecommunication, energy, land, and water supply systems),
labor resources, legal system and investment environments are all superior to those in
other places. Investment in Shenzhen has been encouraged by preferential tax treatment
and other incentives especially developed by the central government for joint-ventures.
Wide managerial latitude is allowed, including decisions regarding labor. Shenzhen offers
bonuses to motivate workers and endorses the labor-contract system under which workers
are paid in accordance with the job they are doing, not simply by their rank. Shenzhen’s
enterprises are less subject to detailed state plans, have less bureaucratic supervising, and
have more opportunities for direct access to funding.
Simplification o f the economic bureaucracy has been undertaken.

In order to

avoid systematic complications, Shenzhen reduced the bureaucracy between enterprises
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and the top local government agency. There is now only one layer of bureaucracy instead
o f two.
Freedom in land use reforms has been initiated.

In addition to outright foreign

ownership of land, the government allows foreign investors to build their own plants or
factories on land leased, rented, or otherwise provided by the state.^ Investors have the
freedom to sell and mortgage their land-using right to banks or others.

From

January to November, 1990, there were 662 new foreign investment projects that received
approval. The total investment amount in 1990 increased by 30 percent compared with
the same period of 1989 and reached US$630 million.’®
The mayor of Shenzhen predicts that by the end of this century, it will be securely
established as an industrially oriented SEZ.

It will have a diversified economy,

generating trade in areas such as science and technology, finance, tourism, agriculture,
animal husbandry and fishing.

Although Shenzhen has been the most dynamic and

successful SEZ, in the opinion o f the Taiwanese, it is not as atttactive as the Xiamen
SEZ.’® Nevertheless, as much as 16.16 percent o f the Taiwanese investment funds that
China obtained actually flowed into Shenzhen SEZ.

By April 1991, 537 Taiwanese

investors had come to invest in Shenzhen and 90 percent of those gained profits.’^
Taiwanese investors in Shenzhen typically have three characteristics in common.
First, over 70 percent o f Taiwanese investments are wholly-owned enterprises. Second,
they are focused on small and medium-sized businesses such as electronics, machinery,
textiles, plastics, hardware, toys, shoes, umbrellas and furniture. Third, by way of turn
key operation, almost all o f the Taiwanese investors shifted their skills, management
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talent, advanced equipment and sometimes entire factories/plants to Shenzhen.
Shenzhen’s products made by enterprises with Taiwanese investment capital are higher
in quality and offer greater variety of styles than PRC’s products.
Ironically, if the Taiwanese and other foreign investors remain in Shenzhen, they
may experience some problems that may obstruct their industrial developm ent Although
Shenzhen’s investment environment is better than other areas in China, this environment
is still not highly developed and modernized. It lacks specialists, capital and high-tech
and managerial skills. Nearly 50 percent of the jobs are part-time and a large number of
workers are actually from other provinces.

Labor resources are not easy to control.

Labor costs have doubled since 1987, although they are still one-third the price of labor
in Hong Kong.
Other segments of the economy besides manufacturing are available to Taiwanese
investors. Houses and land leasing rights can be owned and sold by private persons in
Shenzhen. Shenzhen has a land area twice that of Hong Kong, and construction costs
are lower. Real estate (houses, factories and land) is a new opportunity for investors.
Foreign ownership in these areas was approved in early 1991. By 1991, housing and land
prices had gone up three to four times compared to the previous three years.
As China is planning to develop its oil refining sector, petrochemical and
petrochemical downstream industries have gained potential for Taiwanese investors.
Taiwan has the capability to export advanced equipment and technology in these areas.

With plenty of tourist areas near Hong Kong, tourism, hotel and restaurant
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businesses are all good industries for investors.

Taiwanese enterprises can use their

management methods and managerial skills to offer better services and improve the poor
management in state-owned hotels and restaurants.
Generally speaking, foreign bank systems are more flexible regarding foreign
currency transmittance and can offer more attractive customer services than PRC-owned
banks. Since the system of Chinese banks is limited and more restricted, foreign banks
are more popular in Shenzhen.’* Although some of them have the capital and expertise,
Taiwanese investors are limited by ROC government’s restrictions in their activity in
Taiwan’s banking sector. With the more open regulations available in Shenzhen, the
banking business is potentially lucrative for Taiwanese investors.
The furniture industry is another new business in Shenzhen. The living standard
in Shenzhen is rising and creating demand for furniture in local markets.

Furniture

requests in the international market are also increasing. There is a convenient supply of
wood materials both from inner provinces and imported from abroad. Thanks to the
reputation of the quality and innovative design of their products, Taiwanese furniture
enterprises can bring their advanced skills to develop the Shenzhen furniture industry.
S hantou SEZ
Before 1949, Shantou was a trading center in Guangdong province, like
Guangzhou. Ten years ago, what is now Shantou SEZ was an area of rolling dunes and
low-lying land over-grown with weeds. In 1981, Shantou had an area of only 1.6 square
kilometers within Longhu area. After 1984, it was expanded to include the whole 22.6
square kilometers of Longhu and 30 square kilometers of the Guangao area.
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As Shantou is located in the subtropical zone, its climate and land conditions are
suitable for the cultivation o f large quantities o f vegetables, fruits, flowers, fishery and
aquatic products. In 1980s-1990s, Shantou has become well-known for its high-quality
agriculture products and has many highly-trained agricultural technologists. It has also
become an experimental agriculture station for the surrounding areas.

In its new

agricultural area, Shantou has built up special ponds to raise shrimp and eels. Production
lines include fruit canning, instant-freezing o f lobsters and vegetable processing (e.g.
broccoli and asparagus). Other processing operations involve fresh-preservation of fruit,
meat, bread and snack foods and refining of oyster sauce. By using imported fine breeds
and advanced technology, Shantou has set up various orchards and pig, duck, fish and
pigeon farms to enlarge its agricultural exports and speed up the modernization of its
agriculture.^®
Taiwan was once the largest producer of shrimp and other marine products in the
world. Novice farmers rushed into the industry and ran into problems. Poor cultivation
practices, overpopulation o f shrimp or fish in ponds where diseases easily spread, and the
difficulty in acquiring land in Taiwan caused production costs to rise rapidly. A number
o f Taiwanese aquacultural investors went overseas to find profitable development sites.
Shantou has geographic advantages, highly knowledgeable agricultural specialists
and cheaper production costs Oabor, land and ponds). Since 1987, together with other
developed zones, Shantou has made China the largest shrimp producer in the world (see
Table 6).

Thus, one o f the most attractive fields for Taiwan is aquaculture, where

Taiwanese producers can exchange their knowledge and experience with the local
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specialists.

In the late 1980’s, Taiwanese investors started to invest in Shantou.

By

March 1989, there were 13 Taiwanese-owned enterprises there.

T able 6
A SIA ’S S H R IM P FARM ERS
(Output of cultured crustaceans, in ’(XX) tones)
CO U N TRY
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam

’80 181 ’82 ’83
2.7 3.0 3.4 3.8
0.1 2.0 5.0 9.6
11.2 11.2 11.2 14.9
24.0 28.6 ;31.1 28.0
1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.2
1.4 1.7 1.8 13.0
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.1
3.9 6.1 9.6 11.0
8.2 10.9 10.4 12.7
4.0 4.0 7.0 7.0

IM
8.2
22.0
17.0
32.4
2.1
0.1
0.1
29.7
0.3
13.4
16.2
13.0

’85
11.3
42.7
17.0
38.9
2.2
0.1
0.2
30.3
0.3
65.0
18.5
18.0

’86 ’87 ’88
19.5 22.1 25.0
85.4 156.0 200.0
17.0 17.0 30.0
41.1 42.6 50.0
2.5
2.5 2.5
0.2 0.5
0.1
0.4
0.4 3.0
32.5 36.9 40.0
0.4 0.5
0.3
75.0 90.0 20.0
19.1 22.6 40.0
23.8 28.6 30.0

Source: R.O.C., Food and Agriculture Organization

There are other good fields in which to invest in Longhu. They include textiles,
electronics, fine chemicals, aquatic products, fruit and vegetable and flower planting,
recreation centers, banking services and warehousing. In Guangao, the better industries
to invest in are tourism, petrochemistry, light textiles, fisheries, aquatic products,
transportation and banking services.'*®
Shantou is the second most attractive SEZ to Taiwanese investors, next to
Xiamen.'**

In order to attract more Taiwanese investors, Shantou established some

special regulations for them.'*^

Taiwanese investors need not pay user-fees for
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plants/factories, land and houses for the first five years. Machines, plants, factories and
houses can use rapid cumulative depreciation. Taiwanese industries can be managed by
their relatives in China. If a Taiwanese investment exceeds US$1 million, two o f the
investor’s relatives in China are allowed change their status from rural residents to urban
citizens. This means they can obtain the benefits of urban citizens, such as not being
required to work as farmers, they can be assigned to a better job, and they can move and
live in urban areas. If a Taiwanese owns over 25 percent of the stock share in Shantou’s
joint venture and technical co-operation industries, two of their relatives may also enjoy
the same privileges as described above. Similar to other SEZs, Taiwanese investors can
also invest in land development in Shantou.
Xiam en SEZ
Xiamen is an urban SEZ located right on the shore o f Fujian Province, just across
the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan.

Xiamen SEZ was established in 1980, including 2.2

square kilometers of Huli Industrial Zone. By 1984, the local government had expanded
the land area o f Xiamen SEZ to encompass the entirety o f Xiamen island, which is 130
square kilometers.
Since 1984, Xiamen has tried to improve its infrastructure through US$540 million
of government investment, including transportation, public utilities and connununication
systems.

This amount was 54 times the total state investment that Xiamen received

during the period from 1949 through 1979.^^ These efforts have resulted in an expanded
and reliable infrastructure.

During the whole year of 1987, there was not a single

interruption of electrical power supply to Huli. Railroad and highway systems have been
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expanded and upgraded to handle the doubled volume o f traffic since 1980.^
Unlike other SEZs, which were built on bare marsh and farm land, Xiamen had
an established industrial base. Xiamen had a large number of factories, a commercial port
and, compared with much of the rest of China, a better-educated workforce (The Xiamen
University is located here).
Among all foreign investments, only 18 projects came from Taiwan. During this
time, the development goal of Xiamen was focused on export processing industries and
tourism. Overseas Chinese investors were the ftrst group o f tourists that Xiamen wanted
to attract.'*^ Since 1989, the total amount of foreign investment absorbed by Xiamen
(US$18,285 million) has surpassed Shenzhen and ranked Xiamen first among the coastal
areas of China.^
In 1988, many o f the limitations on travel between Taiwan and (Zhina were
relaxed, and the Taiwanese government began to allow its citizens to visit their relatives
in China. Taiwanese investors started to operate in Xiamen through trade and investment.
Almost one-third of the Taiwanese capital invested in China flowed into this area. From
then on, development and investment in Xiamen started to boom. By the end o f 1988,
113 Taiwanese investors, almost all of whom had invested in labor-intensive industries,
had moved into this zone."*^
By the end of November 1989, there were 225 Taiwanese investors who invested
their money in Xiamen. Although they were relative latecom ^s, Taiwanese entrepreneurs
outstripped in 1989, in total investment, the veteran investors from Hong Kong, overseas
Chinese and other foreign investors. O f total foreign investment in Xiamen in 1989,
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almost 70 percent came from Taiwan.

Since then, the foreign investment amount in

Xiamen has surpassed that in Shenzhen, giving Xiamen the highest Taiwanese investment
among all SEZs. Almost 50 percent of the total Taiwanese investment in China flowed
into Fujian Province, with Xiamen sharing 33 percent of this figure.'**
The cost of labor in Xiamen was the lowest among the SEZs before 1988.
Although it had almost doubled by 1991, it was still very low, compared with that outside
China. Turnover for the highest paid workers and total overhead costs were both low,*’
Taiwanese investments in Xiamen are largely in manufacturing and production; whollyowned enterprises were geared towards production for export.
focused on small and medium-sized businesses.

The investments have

Almost 40 percent o f Taiwanese

investments have accomplished the cycle of investment, production, and remuneration
within only one year. Most of these investments have been channeled into light and
labor-intensive industries such as production of shoes, eyeglasses, plastics, and electronics
and chemical engineering projects.^ These businesses imported from abroad 80 percent
o f the raw materials used in production. Over 80 percent o f its production was exported
to Taiwan’s international market. Xiamen’s ultimate success will depend on its ability
to develop as a source of both investment and production materials to the Taiwanese.
This is not unrealistic, as in the past three years, over 90 percent o f Taiwanese investors
gained profits in Xiamen.
Taiwanese initially invested in Xiamen on a trial basis. Their investments were
always placed in low-cost, labor-intensive industry. Today, Taiwanese investors have
changed their attitude and turned to long-term, stable investment, group investment and
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entire-area development. In response, the local government established a new Taiwanese
Investment Zone (TIZ) and granted special privileges for Taiwanese investors in order to
encourage them. This TIZ includes the old Xiamen SEZ and is expanded to cover the
Xingling and Haichang areas.
The sudden boom in Xiamen’s economy has resulted in some problems:
Lack of infrastructure. An increase in number of plants/factories has caused a
power shortage problem. The increase in business also brought about an increase
of vehicles involved in transportation, thus giving rise to frequent traffic jam s in
Xiamen.
Shortage of business space.

Hotel and office accommodations have become

inadequate as more businessmen come to this area.

The ever-increasing

investment from Taiwan led to a shortage of supply o f plants/factories. Some
Taiwanese investors had no recourse but to rent schools or military camps as their
provisional plants/factories.
Speculative activities. As Taiwanese investment increased in Xiamen, the prices
of land-use rights and houses spiraled. Many Taiwanese went into the real estate
business.
Low skill level in the workforce. The economic boom in Xiamen led to a great
demand for high-tech specialists and high-level managers. Despite their relatively
good education, the average skill level o f workers and managers was still quite
low. The cost o f training the Chinese and providing expatriate management for
foreign joint ventures was correspondingly high.
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As Taiwan and Xiamen share one dialect (Minnanhua), food culture and common
heritage (over half of Taiwanese’s ancestors were from Fujian), there is some kinship and
special feeling between them. Hence, tourism is a good field to develop. In addition,
real estate prices in Xiamen had nearly doubled from 1988 to 1990. Real estate trading
business is another potentially profitable field for Taiwanese investors.
Taiwan’s plastics and petrochemical tycoon, Yung-ching Wang, has announced
that his company, Formosa Plastics, will invest in a naphtha-cracking plant in Xiamen in
the m id-1990’s.

A large number o f related mid- and downstream petrochemical

processors which are suffering from a shortage o f raw materials will follow W ang to
China to join the 700 Taiwan petrochemical processors who are already there.®^ This
will be another boost for Xiamen’s economy.

Petrochemicals and their mid- and

downstream petrochemical processing industries are all potential profit-yielding fields for
Taiwanese investors in Xiamen.
In view of Taiwan’s new technology and skills in breeding, raising, and packing
aquatic products, the Xiamen government has developed another investment area —
Dongshan Island, a county of Xiamen, for Taiwanese aquaculture investment. By March
1991, there were 16 Taiwanese businesses invested in aquatic products raising and
processing. The total investment was US$9.3 million.®^
C h in a’s Coastal Cities.
In 1984, Beijing opened its fourteen coastal cities to complement its SEZ
development plans. According to their characteristics, these fourteen cities can be divided
into four c a te g o rie ss y n th e tic open, trading, base and harbor transporting.
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As of 1991, synthetic open style includes Shanghai, Tiangjin, and Guangzhou.
The requirements to be in this category include having been an economic center, having
obtained higher technology and management skills, having more developed international
trade, and possessing convenient transportation and developed industries.
In 1991, the trading category included three cities: Dalian, Qingdao, and Ningbo.
The special features of these cities are that they have attracted more foreign investors than
other cities and they might develop to be the potential middlemen between China and
outside countries.
Base category in 1991 included Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Nantong, Yantai, Zhanjiang,
and Beihai. These cities have easy access to raw materials and natural resources.
Harbor transporting category had only two cities to date: Qianghuangdao, and
Lianyungang.
Only Shanghai and Dalian will be discussed in this report.
S hanghai
Shanghai, the so-called oriental Paris, is the largest city and sea port in China. It
is a gate to the Yangtze River areas, and it serves as a window to the outside world.
Since the beginning of economic reform, it has also become an economic, commercial
(i.e., import and export products gathering spot), information, industrial, and financial
center in China.

The old city o f Shanghai,

including Hongqiao, Minghang, and

Zhaohejing industrial areas, is on the western side of the Huangpu River.
In order to accelerate development in Shanghai, the government offered Taiwanese
and other foreign investors some special benefits that differ little from those already
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enjoyed by the SEZs (i.e., sizeable tax concessions, the grant o f land leases, and banking
services’ setting). Other enticements include a 15 percent low profit tax rate for joint
ventures and other foreign enterprises. If enterprises are committed for 10 years or more,
they are duty-free for the first two profitable years. In the third profitable year, they are
granted a 50 percent reduction in tax. They can import duty-free raw materials and
equipment. There is a five-year tax holiday for foreign businesses involved in building
infrastructural facilities (airports, ports, railroads, subways, and power systems), followed
by a 50 percent reduction in tax for the next five years.
Foreign banks and other financial services are allowed to operate on a trial basis.
Only foreign currency transactions are permitted.
handle renminbi business.

Foreign banks are not allowed to

Red tape has been reduced to a minimum (the approval

process for foreign operations has been shortened from originally having to obtain 133
separate chops (approvals) to 20), with traders exempt from having to obtain visas.
The Pudong sector of Shanghai has the right to retain its revenues for further
development. It also established a free-trade zone (FTZ). Imports moving into this FTZ
are tax-free if they are intended for re-export. W ide consultation with scientists and
people from all sectors has resulted in full use of the city’s geographical, industrial, and
scientific advantages to develop economic links with other countries.^ Foreign investors
may own shares in the local stock m arket They also have the right to lease large tracts
o f land for 50-70 years for development. As the statistics show, foreign joint ventures
have done better in Shanghai than elsewhere in China. Almost 98 percent have gained
profits from investments in Shanghai, while'the failure rate of investment in other places
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is 60 percent/^

However, some chronic problems (e.g. shortage of cash and raw

materials, and poor transportation) still present obstacles to development.
Shanghai, Ningbo, Hainan, and other opened cities share almost 60 percent of all
the Taiwanese investment in China.^

To Taiwanese investors, Shanghai is not as

attractive as other opened areas in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces.^^ Shanghai has not
enough infrastructure to meet the rapidly increasing demand. In 1987, the price of raw
materials skyrocketed and production costs rose.

After the Tiananmen incident, the

central government even restricted shipping and selling of raw materials within China.
This brought about a raw materials shortage for the industries in Shanghai. The only way
to solve the problem was to import more expensive raw materials from abroad by using
scarce, costly foreign currency.
Although Shanghai has a special tax incentive for investors to invest in local
infrastructure, foreign investors will probably be reluctant to make major investment in
this infrastructure. It takes too long for this kind of investment to recover the capital and
to yield a profit.
In 1989, the city’s profit tax on industrial enterprises was 33 percent o f earnings,
compared to a national average tax o f 19 percent (and just 17 percent in Guangdong
Province). Each year Shanghai contributes 60-70 percent o f its income to the state. In
1989, it was allowed to keep 33 percent of the revenue, up from 25 percent previously.
Shanghai’s annual contribution to the state is computed to be as much as one-sixth of the
country’s total revenue. The real revenue from investment that investors might keep in
Shanghai is not as profitable as in other opened areas.®*
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In 1990, Taiwanese investment in Shanghai was computed at over

US$100

million, and the total investment amount had surpassed US$300 million. It is evident that
Taiwanese investors are most interested in Pudong. In March 1990, the local government
set up Taiwan Business and Industries Zones for the more than 7500 Taiwanese investors
in Shanghai.

The Taiwanese focused their investments primarily on textiles, food

processing, and tourism. They also invested in hotels, recreation centers, department
stores and golf course development.
Dalian
In 1984, when China was still in the initial stage o f opening its door to trade,
Dalian was only a wasteland of 3 square kilometers dotted with fishing villages. It is
located in the southern part of Liaodong Peninsula in Liaoning Province.

Today it

functions as a key link in import and export of the three northeastern provinces and Inner
Mongolia. An international, commercial and industrial harbor, it has regular shipping
business with over sixty countries. It has a modem industrial base, and is home to a
number o f foreign joint ventures.^
To create the best possible atmosphere for cooperation with potential partners from
overseas, Dalian concentrated its efforts on setting up modem infrastructure facilities.
Since 1985, the local govemment has invested Rmb 430 million (US$80.83 million) in
its basic infrastructure.

Its overall aim was to develop advanced and export-oriented

technology industries, with a special emphasis on high-tech projects and capital-intensive
industries that have an objective to export 60 percent of their output. By 1990, it had
expanded to a new 20 square kilometers’ Economic and Technological Developed Zone.
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The major industries in Dalian are electronics, machinery, chemical products, textiles,
food processing, light manufacturing, and ship building.
From January to June, 1990, the total export value from Dalian was US$2.68
billion, a 23.3 percent increase from 1989.“

The average annual volume o f foreign

shipments handled in Dalian Harbor was 50 million tons, comprising 68 percent o f the
total foreign shipments in China.
Entrepreneurs who started their businesses in Dalian before the end o f 1990 were
offered a 10-30 percent discount on land rents. In order to attract high-tech knowledge,
the municipal govemment set up several areas for foreign investors to use. The investors
are free to transfer or sell their use and lease rights. The land use and rental periods are
for 50 years.
Dalian has an excellent geographic location for both land and water transport.
Investors might come not only for the immediate economic benefits, but with an eye to
its future development.®*

Given these incentives, shipping enterprises and firms that

handle the harbor loading and unloading services and transit marine cargos might be good
investments in Dalian.
The scenery is attractive and the climate is pleasant in Dalian. The northeastern
provinces are the original home of the Ching Dynasty.

The historic sites attract

Taiwanese tourists. Tourism might be a profitable field to invest in.

The

three

northeastern provinces, together with Inner Mongolia, make up a vast area with rich
manpower, ample natural resources, strong industrial bases and a considerable technical
force. In cooperation with the U.S., China has set up a Dalian industrial and technical
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management training center. It is close to the iron, steel, coal operations (Anshun and
Shenyang) and aluminium (Fushun) mines. These natural resources are all very important
in Taiwan’s heavy industry development.

As Dalian has convenient access to ample

resources that Taiwan is short of, it is better for Taiwanese investors to use local minerals
to develop heavy industries in Dalian than to invest in other coastal cities.
Taiwanese investors can invest in the emerging mill or steel refinery areas, or in
raw materials export. By way of turn key operations, Taiwanese industries in Dalian can
reduce costs and control the quality of their products. In the last two years, Taiwanese
investors in Dalian have focused on value added industries like building materials, food
processing, metallurgy, chemicals, electronics, and machinery.
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C H A PTER IV.
OBSTACLES EX PERIEN CED BY TA IW A N E SE IN V ESTO R S

Basic In fra stru c tu re System:
A shortage o f infrastructure is a chronic problem in China. Some opened coastal
cities, such as Nantong, Wenzhou, and Beihai rely on highways as the major form of
transportation.

Some areas have just one railroad.^

Lack of transportation systems

(railroads, highways, harbors and airports) causes a raw materials shortage for the
industries in the opened coastal areas. Transporting raw materials from inner China to
the coastal areas is difficult, and the cost is higher than importing from outside countries.
China has promised Taiwanese enterprises adequate energy supplies, but there is
still a 15 percent to 20 percent energy shortage, and energy interruptions of two to three
days a week are not uncommon. Production, delivery, and distribution schedule delays
due to inefficient energy supply and transportation are very common in China.”
Out-of-date telecommunication systems cause delays in receiving information from
and about the outside world. This causes investors to lose opportunities and to make
incorrect business decisions. This will indirectly influence the reputation (high efficiency
and good quality) and profits of Taiwanese enterprises in China. This, in turn, causes
Taiwanese industries to only accept long-term or regular orders for their products, giving
up the short-term or rushed orders.
Since the Tiananmen incident, the World Bank has adopted a tighter policy for
loans to China. The tighter credit from outside o f China, combined with the shortage of

33
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funds from within China, has caused serious shortages of capital for infrastructure. These
problems have caused Taiwanese investors to avoid investment in inner China and to
focus on Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. Total Taiwanese investment in these areas
represented one-tenth of the total amount of foreign investment as of 1989.^
R aw M aterials Supply:
China’s inefficient transportation system makes it difficult to transport building
and industrial materials. It is illegal to trade raw materials between provinces due to the
1988 austerity policy.

This problem has caused some raw materials producers or

producing provinces to arbitrarily raise the price o f raw materials.
quality of raw materials are hard for management to control.

The quantity and

This causes delays in

production and delays delivery dates. Although China faces a foreign currency shortage,
investors must still spend their foreign currency to import more expensive raw materials
from other countries.

The short supply of raw materials increases the investment risk

for Taiwanese investors, and causes economic inflation in China.
G overnm ent A dm inistration:
In order to increase the development in opened coastal areas, China granted more
privileges and authority to local governments. This has led to some enterprises having
to pay unreasonable taxes or fees, under threat o f losing approval of the local govemment
officials.
China has simplified the permission and approval process for Taiwanese investors,
but the bureaucracy and overlapping organizations in the Chinese govemment continue
to cause the paperwork process to be a time-consuming process filled with delays.
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Spending 6 months to 1 year waiting for the approval from over a hundred govemment
officials is not uncommon when setting up a business in China.^^ This wastes investors’
money and time. The officials often try to shirk their responsibility to avoid troubles,
which increases the paper shuffling by investors even after production has begun.
Chinese like to use "guanxi" (the Chinese word for connections or contacts) when
they deal in business. There are some implicit agreements or so-called "understandings"
between businessmen and officials.^ The businessmen give under-the-table money, and
offer social parties and gifts to the public officials who handle their cases.

If the

Taiwanese investors do not have any close relationships or know any important officials
in the government, the permission and approval process will be extremely difficult for
those who are not schooled in this type o f business dealing. If they do have "guanxi" in
the govemment organization, they do not even need the normal application process, and
are able to get the permission license privately.
If raw materials are imported for processing, but the completed products are only
exported, the Taiwanese enterprises can apply for an import tax reimbursement on them.
This is a special preference for Taiwanese enterprises, but the application process is
complicated and applicants can not apply for the entire import tax reimbursement at one
time. The order of tax reimbursement does not give Taiwanese investors any preference.
It only increases their problems because the amount of time that it takes due to the
bureaucratic red tape may not be worth the amount o f money that is received as a tax
reimbursement.
Legal System :
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Besides central government control, every local govemment can enact its own
regulations. There are 35 provinces and more than 10 municipalities in China, leading
to many different types of regulations in the country. Ironically, from a profit standpoint,
sometimes the regulations which are enacted by the local govemment will conflict with
those issued by the central govemment. For example: the central government forbids
Taiwanese investors to invest in hotels, restaurants, and department stores. In order to
attract Taiwanese investors, a number of opened coastal areas allow investment in these
fields. There is not a standard rule for investors to follow.
Although there are a number of supposedly preferential treatments for Taiwanese
investors, the effectiveness of the measures depend on the language of the law. It is not
clear what the terms are.*^

For example, the Regulation on Encouraging Foreign

Investment announced that foreign investors can refuse to pay unreasonable fees.
However, there is no definition of what is an unreasonable fee, and no legal rules stating
what constitutes violations. In view o f this inept legal system, the person who charges
the unreasonable fees to the investors will never be punished. There is not an arbitration
system or neutral organization to handle the cases for the Taiwanese investors who have
suffered from unfair treatment.**
Since China is without legal concepts and business ethics, the contracts signed by
both China and the investors might be arbitrarily modified.

The investors may have

thought items in the contract they signed were satisfactory and fair. However, the items
in the contract might be totally different from the original contract. Usually both parties
sign the last page, enabling one to have the other pages changed. The best way for the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
investors to avoid being cheated by China is for both parties to chop (stamp), sign, or
impress the thumb on the binding between each page of the contract. To prevent page
editing, both parties must keep track on the top o f each edited column.
Political Situation:
China’s economic policies always follow its political policies. In view of China’s
internal political problems, with top-level bureaucrats fighting among themselves for
power, its political policies are not stable.

This instability causes erratic economic

policies, which sometimes tighten and sometimes relax. Between tightening and relaxing,
it makes it difficult for investors to have principles to follow.
Before the Tiananmen incident, Taiwanese could get multiple-entry visas from
China. After Tiananmen, China was scared of bad influences (i.e., invasion of democratic
ideas) from Taiwan and suddenly changed its policy to a single entry visa for Taiwanese.
In 1988 and 1989, China changed its international trading policy three times. It
focused on export trade, then changed to both domestic and export trade.

After the

Tiananmen incident, it switched to restricted import and controlled export policy further
confusing potential investors.
O peratin g Costs:
There are two kinds o f operational costs in China. The first is the visible cost.
This includes labor wages, bonuses, overhead (taxes, raw materials, telecommunication,
delivery, water, power, rental, managerial, and transportation expenses), as discussed
above.

The other is the invisible cost.

This includes several kinds o f fees that the

investors would not know about before they moved into China. These include social.
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problem solving, investment consultant, research, and training fees. Both costs are a
heavy burden for Taiwanese investors.

The invisible cost cannot be controlled or

researched before investments flow into China.^
It is difficult for the investors to predict the future profits of enterprises. Since
1985, the land, housing, and product prices in China have been getting higher, causing
a serious inflation problem. In the first six months o f 1988, the retail price index rose
by 13 percent, and the cost of living for workers in the major cities grew by 14,4
percent.^® The living and production operation costs in China in 1991 were two to three
times higher than in 1988,
Although wages have increased, many people still complain that the rate at which
incomes rise cannot keep up with the rate o f inflation.

China now has the highest

inflation rate in Asia, (see Table 7)
Another problem in China that increases the investors’ operation costs is the
serious depreciation of its renminbi. For example, in late 1988, one U.S. dollar converted
to approximately 3.5 Rmb. In May of 1991, Rmb 5.32 converted to one U.S. dollar. The
renminbi depreciation problem causes Taiwanese enterprises, which import raw materials
for processing, to spend more renminbi to buy the needed raw materials.
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T ab le 7
IN FL A T IO N RATES IN SELEC TED ASIAN CO U N TRIES (I981-I990)
Unit: Percent
- 1983
6.9

1984 - 1987
0.2

1988
1.3

1989
4.5

1990
4.5

11.5
10.9
11.2
6.4
11.1
4.5
10.5
7.2
1.9

4.9
10.9
7.6
1.5
19.6
0.6
2.7
1.9
6.2

7.5
9.4
8.0
2.5
8.7
1.5
7.1
3.8
18.5

10.0
8.5
6.5
4.0
10.5
2.5
6.5
6.0
21.0

7.5
10.0
7.5
4.5
11.0
2.8
7.5
6.5
12.0

Average figure of
Asian Countries 7.2

6.1

10.5

11.6

9.1

1981
Rep. of China
(Taiwan)
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Thailand
People’s Rep.
of China

Source; Asian Economic Commentary, November 1989.

L a b o r Q uality:
Although China has ample labor resources, there are problems with the quality of
its labor force. The investors cannot hire or fire workers without permission of local
govemment.

The workers have no fear of bad performance in their jobs.

Chatting,

skipping work, or leaving the office early are common problems in China.
Although the investors pay higher wages to their workers, compared with the
wages of those who work for Chinese enterprises, the Chinese workers cannot receive all
their wages from foreign enterprises. The actual payment the workers receive is almost
the same as if they worked for domestic enterprises.

For example, every month the
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enterprise pays Rmb 600 to its workers. The actual amount the worker can receive might
only be Rmb 150. W ithout any incentive, the workers will not be very productive.
Bad labor quality can influence the production quality. W orld Bank statistics show
that China is one o f the lowest working efficiency countries in the world, (see Table 8)
Combining the wage and working efficiency problems in China, the overall operations
cost may actually be cheaper in Taiwan.

T able 8
CO M PA RA TIV E LA BO R W A G ES AND EFFIC IEN C Y
C ou n try
U.S.
Japan
Singapore
Taiwan
Hong Kong
South Korea
China (Representative — Shenzhen)

Index__
100
75
60
33
32
22
18

Source: The World Bank 1989 Statistic Survey.

Foreign C urrency an d M onetary System:
In view of the shortage of foreign currency, China has severely controlled this
resource.

In order to prevent foreign currency outflow, China requires that foreign

investors use a convertible foreign currency to reimburse loans to Chinese banks, to pay
for the cost of imported raw materials, to pay salaries of their foreign workers, and to pay
for profit distribution to foreign stockholders. These restrictions cause investors to have
a large supply of foreign currency, but the foreign currency demand exceeds the supply.
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M any investors can only get the foreign currency they need on the black market. This
has caused the price of foreign currency to skyrocket over its official stated value, which
then invisibly increases the operation cost for the foreign investors.’^
It is also difficult for investors to repatriate profits out o f China. They can only
reinvest their profits back into China’s market. The investing enterprises vastly prefer to
use cash when conducting business in China because checking accounts and capital
movement are difficult using Chinese banks.

The amount of funds that Taiwanese

investors need may be two to three times more than they need to invest in Taiwan.
There are three kinds of currency circulated in China: Renminbi is used only in
the domestic market; Foreign Exchange Certificates (EEC) can be kept by the foreigner
and used in hotels, govemment owned department stores, or foreign enterprises; and
foreign currency can be used in

international transactions. They all have their own

exchange rate in the official market. The official exchange rates for EEC and foreign
currency are usually two to three times less than the rate in the black market. There are
too many types of currencies to be controlled by the government, causing confusion for
the foreign investors.
Some investors run currency speculation businesses. They buy EEC or foreign
currency first, and then exchange it in the black market to obtain two to three times as
much renminbi. The people who own EEC or foreign currency can obtain more cash by
exchanging the currency. This gives the enterprises more funds to run their businesses.
Although the investors can obtain more by exchanging EEC or foreign currency on the
black market, it is riskier for them. Using this source of funds, a number of Taiwanese
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investors have been swindled by speculating in the black market.
B anking Problem s:
Chinese National Banks do not accept letters of credit (L/C) from Taiwanese
banks, and vice versa. This is because any kind o f amendment to the credit and banking
regulations would entail an enormous amount of negotiation between China and Taiwan.
The only option for both parties is to allow banks from a third country to process L/C
forms for Taiwan and China. This further complicates the banking process and increases
the payment time.
In order for Taiwanese enterprises to import raw materials from outside China,
they need permission from the Chinese govemment.

After the investors obtain

permission, they can request that the Bank of China issue its letters of credit. Due to
China’s shortage of foreign currency, the approval for import permission and the
application for L/C can be difficult.
shipping delays.

These factors cause production schedules and

The delays hurt the reputation o f Taiwanese enterprises in the

international market.
Since there is a shortage of funds in China, loan service for Taiwanese investors
is more difficult than other services in Chinese banks. According to Taiwan law, direct
investment in China is still illegal for Taiwanese investors. It is impossible for Taiwanese
enterprises who set up businesses in China to obtain support (loans) from Taiw an’s banks.
The Taiwanese investors must have their own capital or get loans from third country
banks when considering the financing of their enterprises.
F u tu re Problem s:
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Hong Kong is the bridge for Taiwanese trading and investment in China. In 1997,
Hong Kong will be returned to China. The political situation in China is not yet stable,
so it is hard for Taiwanese investors to predict China's future strategy in managing Hong
Kong. The chronic political problems between Taiwan and China will not be solved in
a short period o f time. Perhaps Taiwanese investors who have a branch office or agent
in Hong Kong would be better off to try to find another third party country in which to
locate.
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C H A PT E R V.
SUM M ARY AND CO N CLU SIO N S

After the Tiananmen incident, the American Business Environment Risk
Information Service surveyed each country’s investing environment and income difference
among citizens, the political and social environment, and availability of foreign exchange.
The company rated China as one o f the riskiest areas for investment for the next five
years. The lowest risk areas obtained an index of one (e.g., Taiwan, Japan, Singapore,
and West Germany), while China received an index of three.^^
The factors influencing Taiwanese investment in China are political stability, labor
resource, the

stability of economic

strategy, market potential, and the

social

atmosphere.^^ (see Table 9) Political stability is the most important factor for Taiwanese
investors to evaluate before investing capital in China.

T able 9
CO M PA RA TIV E INVESTM ENT FA C TO R S IN FLU EN C IN G
IN V ESTM EN T (From a Survey of T aiw anese Investors)
(Unit: percent)
July, 1989
Political Stability
91.7
Labor Problem
58.8
Stabilities of Economic Strategy
52.5
Market Potential
44.9
Social atmosphere
22.6

TA IW A N ESE

M ay 1988
66.8
56.8
42.3
58.1
45.2

Source: Global Views Monthly, July 14, 1989; 162
Due to the unstable political environment, investment in China is riskier than in
44
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other countries.

The two Chinese economies would greatly benefit from a normal

economic relationship. China offers Taiwan a familiar investment environment with the
same language, customs, and living styles. It also offers a potentially huge market with
ample labor resources, a large supply o f untapped natural resources, and a relatively solid
heavy industry and technological base. It lacks capital and management knowledge. In
contrast, Taiwan, with the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world, has a
resourceful workforce, advanced marketing and management skills, and a very
competitive consumer industry. As the two economies evolve to naturally complement
each other, conditions will become more and more favorable for Taiwanese investment
in China. Although past records indicate that the success rate of Taiwanese investment
in China was only 50 percent, Taiwanese investors are still the fastest-growing group
among all foreign investors in China.^'*
After tlie Tiananmen incident, economic policy has become more conservative in
China, but its onen door policy has never changed. Since 1990, the political situation has
become more stable, and foreign investment has started to return. In the first four months
o f 1991, there were more than 3,100 foreign projects approved, an increase of 90 percent
over the previous year.^* The total value of investment contracts hit US$3.26 billion,
which was 164 percent higher than 1990.

Actual foreign investment value reached

US$857 million, a 16 percent increase. The wholly foreign-owned enterprises increased
106 percent Tliese figures show that the confidence of foreign investors in China is
recovering.^*
Taiwanese investors have shown confidence in China similar to that of other
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foreign investors. Past investment emphasized short-term investments in labor-intensive
industries, in small areas, or on a single industry, and in cooperation with China. Today
the trend is toward long-term investments in high-tech-intensive and capital-intensive
industries, whole-area development, and vertical integration o f related industries.
Taiwanese investors have broadened from concentrating enterprises in Guangdong
and Fujian Provinces to all areas rich in natural resources. They have also changed the
means o f investment from indirect through a third country to over 50 percent direct
investment in China, even though official Taiwanese government policy is that direct
investment remains illegal. The ROC government overlooks these transactions.
There are different regulations and privileges in the SEZs and opened coastal
cities. In each place, there are different natural resources, raw materials, environments,
and/or customs.

These were discussed in chapter in.

From the author’s viewpoint,

although China is a risky place to invest, it is still has great potential as an investment
site for Taiwanese investors.

In view of political reunification and mutual economic

supplementary issues, Taiwanese are treated better than other foreigners in China. China
has m a(k efforts to improve the investing environment.

It not only improved its

infrastructure, but also announced and amended several regulations for Taiwanese
investors.

The influence of China’s internal political instability will not have as drastic

effect on Taiwanese investors as on those from other countries.
Investors should monitor the changes o f the political and economic strategies
before investing in China. Investors should not only research the area and businesses to
invest in, but also study the obstacles that were discussed in chapter IV. Taiwanese
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investors should diversify their investments in order to prevent China from controlling
Taiw an’s economy. The unstable political situation, the changing economic policies, and
unhealthy legal system are still problems inside of China.

Given these concerns,

Taiwanese investors should not depend on China too much.

An appropriate balance

between short- and long-term investments should be sought, with caution (but not
timidity) governing investment activities.
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